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REVIEWS 
The Review Section of E&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of 
brief reviews of books and articles (and perhaps films, etc. J that are con­
cerned in some way with the rights and wrongs of human treatment of non­
human animals. The second part of this Section Is entitled 'Replies' and con­
tains comments on or responses to revIews published in earlier issues of E&A. 
By letter the EdItor invites the authors of works reviewed to respond, and 
by thIs proclamation in each issue Invites all other interested readers to sub­
mit comments. The third part of the RevIews Section is a list of works of 
whIch reviews aNI Invited. Any member who wishes to review any work in 
this continuing 'Reviews Needed' list should contact the EdItor. 
R. I. Sikora, "Morality and Animals," 
circumstances which many be morallyEthics & Animals, 11/3, September, 
1981, pp~ relevant)46-59	  to breed animals for fatal 
experimentation or food as long as 
they are treated humanely prior to 
In "Morality and Animals" R. I. their demise. 
Sikora attempts to rebut some of the 
The objections to animal rightsmore common objections to the animal 
which Si kora considers are the follow­liberation movement. The article, � 
ing:however, is so carelessly constructed	 �  
1. animal pain is less importantand filled with factual inaccuracies, 
that human painsloppy thinking, and outright sophis­
2. human interests always taketry that it harms, more than it helps, 
that cause. Sikora dwells at length precedence over animal interests 
on facile and ludicrous arguments 3. there is no way of knowi ng 
which deserve little or no attention in whether animals feel pain 
a serious philosophical journal, while 4. if we worry about animal pain 
ignoring more intelligent and consid­ we must also worry about plant pain 
ered objections which pose a serious 5. since a short life is better than 
threat to animal rights. Nowhere in no life, it is better for animals to be 
the article do we get more than a bred for slaughter than to have never 
passing glimpse of the philosophical existed 
roots of homocentric prejudice and 6. animals, by their very nature, 
exploitation of non-human animals. cannot have rights 
Sikora's response to those criticisms 
which deserve philosophical attention Objections #1 and #2 together con­
consists, for the most part, of a stitute the general position that human 
piecemeal rehash of arguments which and non-human animals do not deserve 
have al ready been presented much equal moral consideration, and that 
more clearly and rigorously elsewhere. where a conflict occu rs, preferential 
In some cases Sikora makes no attempt treatment should be accorded to 
to argue at all, but merely asserts his humans -- the view, in short, that 
disagreement. Nor is the article free "humans come first." What underlies 
of speciesist prejudice: particularly Sikora's inadequate response to this 
repugnant is Sikora's endorsement of view is Peter Singer's thorough treat­
the view that it is morally acceptable ment of the question in Animal libera­
per ~ (i.e., abstracting from other tion. There are two ways to defend 
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such a claim: by positing spurious 
criteria to distinguish humans from 
animals or by claiming that morality is 
based solely upon agreements (i.e., 
the contract theory), into which ani­
mals cannot enter. Sikora confuses 
the issue by treating separately the 
questions of conflicting pains and con­
flicting interests and by considering 
only one of the many irrelevant cri­
teria used to justify preferential 
treatment of humans, namely, intelli­
gence. His strategy is to point out 
that most people would be unwilling to 
extend thei r reasoning about the rele­
vance of intelligence to human beings 
so as to claim that the pain of less 
intelligent people is less important. 
This is a very unsatisfactory response 
-- not only because some people might 
-- and indeed do -- maintain consis­
tency by claiming that the pain of less 
intelligent people is of less impor­
tance, but also because it completely 
fails to make clear why intelligence is 
an irrelevant criterion for moral con­
sideration. 
Sikora uses the same method to 
criticize the contract theory: in cer­
tain situations we recognize that our 
actions toward other human beings 
. should· not be governed solely by 
agreements. Once again, it· is far 
from obvious that all human beings do 
recognize this, and even if this were 
so, it would not explain what is wrong 
with the contract theory as the basis 
of morality. 
Objections #3 and #4 should not 
even have been honored by a reply. 
They are the product of a fractious 
temperament which will seek any 
superficially clever excuse for continu­
ing to abuse and exploit non-human 
animals. With so much pain and suf­
fering in the world, both human and 
animal, it is almost immoral to engage 
in idle philosophical speculation as to 
how (or whether) it is possible to be 
certain that another living being is in 
pain. I am aware, of course, that my 
reasoning here involves a logical fal­
lacy, which only goes to prove my 
point: obsession with logical proof of 
a blatantly obvious truth is a moral 
error. All one has to do to ma ke the 
world morally inoperative is to engage 
in Systematic Cartesian Doubt, the 
equivalent, in the moral arena, of 
political filibusteri ng. Si kora's rebut­
tal to these objections is the standard 
response already made by Singer and 
others, except that he omits, with 
regard to the question of plant pain, 
an essential point, namely that even if 
plants suffer pain, it is presumably 
less than what animals suffer, and 
hence we should still prefer to inflict 
pain on them rather than animals. 
Granting that animal pain is as 
important as human pain, Si kora con­
cl udes that at least one of two criteria 
must be met for an experiment on a 
non-human animal to be justified: 
there must be good reason to believe 
that· the experiment will either cause 
less suffering than. it prevents or that 
if it were successful it would enor­
mously reduce suffering, although the 
chances are it will not succeed. He 
fails to poi nt out, however, another 
obvious conclusion which follows from 
the principle that animal pain is no 
less important that human pain, 
namely, that we should be equally 
willing to perform the experiment on a 
human being, assuming that in the 
particular case the human being will 
suffer no more pain that the animal. 
Fu rther, we should be willing to 
inflict lesser pain on humans to pre­
vent greater pain in non-human ani­
mals. If we are unwilling to do this 
it can only be due to speciesist preju­
dice, and ou r reluctance should lead 
us eventually to the realization that 
no experiment is justified unless it is 
for the benefit of the animal itself. 
The objection might be made to this 
that there is a relevant difference 
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between human and non-human animals 
in that for the former it is a question 
not only of pain, but also of consent. 
To experiment on a human being 
against his will is to violate his right 
of consent. In the case of non-human 
animals, however, we cannot obtain 
their consent. Does this mean, how­
ever, that we are thereby entitled to 
act as though we didn't need it? The 
cases of babies and idiots would seem 
to indicate that we do not always 
regard the lack of ability to consent 
as dispensation from the need to have 
it. In such cases we typically regard 
the infliction of pain as morally justi­
fied ~ if it benefits the person 
himself. We would not feel morally 
justified in taking it upon ourselves to 
assume that the person, were he able, 
would consent to suffer pain for some­
one else's benefit. 
Moreover, we usually assume that 
there must be an intrinsic connection 
between the pain suffered and the 
benefit reaped, such that suffering 
the pain is necessary in order to reap 
the benefit. Such a connection 
clearly exists in the example cited by 
Sikora of a child who needs a painful 
operation. There is no such connec­
tion, however, in the example he 
gives of "rewards" accorded to animals 
as compensation for being the subjects 
of experiments. 
The hypocrisy of Sikora's position 
becomes even clearer when he consid­
ers the case of fatal ex periments, 
where no possible compensation can be 
provided afterwards to the animal. 
The argument he presents here reads 
more Ii ke propaganda from Charles 
River Laboratories than a philosophical 
argument. The gist of it is that since 
laboratory animals are bred for exper­
imentation and would not have existed 
at all were it not for the vivisectors, 
and since a short,· happy life is better 
than no life at all, experimentation is 
justified, provided the animal is well 
treated prior to experimentation. The 
"reward," in other words, is given in 
advance. 
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In Sikora's account there are actu­
ally two "benefits" which are confused 
with one another. The fi rst is the 
mere fact of having been brought into 
existence. The second is the fact of 
having been humanely prior to exper­
imentation. That it is nonsensical to 
speak of conferring the benefit of 
existence on a "non-existent being" 
has al ready been clea rly demonstrated 
by Peter Singer, Sikora's disclaimers 
notwithstanding. His remarks in this 
regard are sheer sophistry. The fact 
that we prefer, once we a re alive, not 
to die, in no way proves that it is 
meaningful to speak of conferring a 
benefit on a "non-existent being," by 
bringing "it" into existence. Nor is 
the example which he gives later of a 
supposed duty to a "non-existent 
being" valid. A woman's moral duty 
not to bring a defective child into the 
world is not a duty to a "not-yet-ex­
istent defective child" but to the 
actual child who will suffer if she 
conceives and bears him. It is an 
actual being, rather than a potential 
being, which is affected in this case. 
So far as the benefit of bestowing 
a happy life upon the animal is con­
cerned, it is obvious that in this case 
there is no intrinsic connection 
between the pain and the reward. It 
is ludicrous and appalling to Claim 
that the infliction of evil (assuming 
that pain is an evil) is justified by 
the bestowal of good. Si kora admits 
he would not be willing to pursue this 
policy with regard to human beings, 
yet believes that it is not speciesist 
because human beings, unlike animals, 
would know what was in store for 
them, and because they characteristi­
cally have much richer lives than ani­
mals. Would Sikora be willing, then, 
to breed defective human beings for 
experimentation? If not, then he is 
vulnerable to the charge of specie­
sism. 
The same criticisms apply to Siko­
ra's response to the fifth objection. 
One does not have to point to the 
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unlikelihood of humane conditions on 
factory farms or the world hunger 
problem to recognize the absurdity of 
the claim that the benefit of bringing 
. "non-existent beings" into existence 
.and treating them humanely justifies 
slaughtering them for food. It is suf­-
ficient to realize, once again, that the 
bestowal of good can never serve as a 
sufficient moral ground for the inflic­-
tion of evil. As in the previous case, 
the same argument could obviously be 
applied to defective human beings. 
Would Sikora grant the moral accept­-
ability of raising such humans for 
food? If not, h~ is once again open 
to the charge of speciesism. From the 
standpoint of the animal rights activist 
Sikora's position on laboratory experi­-
mentation and meat eating thus 
appears quite reactionary.It sanc­-
tions and reinforces the still prevail­-
ing ethic of homocentric exploitation of 
animals. 
In his discussion of the final objec­-
tion -- that animals by their very 
nature cannot have rights .... - Sikora 
fails to explicate the philosophical 
grounds for denial or attribution of 
rights, but contents himself with out­-
lining the bases for recognition of 
obligations to animals by those who 
deny them rights. He does manage, 
however, to further damage the cause 
of animal liberation· by making the 
preposterous claim that obligations are 
more crucial to animal welfare than 
rights. This is based on the arbi­-
trary example of two individuals, one 
of whom denies animals all rights but 
recognizes ou r obligation to neither 
torture nor kill them, the other of 
whom recognizes both our obligation 
and animals' rights to freedom from 
tortu re, but neither ou r obligation nor 
animals' rights to freedom from kill­-
ing. This example obviously proves 
nothing about the fundamentality or 
importance of obligations vs. rights. 
In point of fact, since rights always 
entail obligations but obligations (in 
the view of many) do not necessarily 
entail rights, the recognition of rights 
;s far more crucial to animal welfare. 
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